THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA,

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(COMMERCIAL DIVISION)

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO 865 OF 2014

ARISING FROM HCCS NO 681 OF 2014

HENRY KAZIRO LWANDASA}............................................APPLICANT/PLAINTIFF

VS

KYAS GLOBAL TRADING CO. LTD}..............................RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT

BEFORE HON. MR. JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA

RULING

The Plaintiff’s Counsel objected to the Defendant being represented by Messieurs Nzige, Jamero and Co Advocates. Particularly Counsel Hilary Nzige appeared in the proceedings as Counsel for the Respondent/Defendant. When the Applicant/Plaintiffs application for a temporary injunction came for hearing, the Plaintiff/Applicant was represented by Counsels Senkumba Ahmed assisted by Kigongo Kassim of Messieurs Senkumba and Company Advocates while the Defendant/Respondent is represented by Hilary Nzige of Messieurs Nzige, Jamero and Advocates.

The objection of the Applicant’s Counsel is that Messieurs Nzige, Jamero and Advocates are not fit and competent to represent the Respondent Company and their participation contravenes regulation 9 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations. It is contended for the Applicant that there is a potential for the lawyers in the said law firm being witnesses in this suit.

Secondly the Applicant’s Counsel submitted that the matters before court are contentious and regulation 9 was intended to safeguard against likelihood of bias on the part of an advocate representing a client.

Thirdly the sale of land agreement contested in the suit was drafted by the said law firm. Secondly annexure “A5” of the affidavit in support is an eviction notice on the letter head of the said firm. At the bottom left of the letter head is the name of Atukunda Isaac described as a partner. Isaac Atukunda deposed the affidavit in reply on behalf of the Respondent as the Company Secretary. Other documents relating to the matter in contention emanate from the same firm of advocates.

Counsel submitted that the principles for establishing whether there was a conflict were discussed by the High Court of Uganda in Uganda vs. Patricia Ojangole Criminal case NO 1 of 2014. The test is both factual and also based on perception when considering the entire transaction. Conflict of interest was also considered in UDB vs. Kasirye, Byaruhanga and Co advocates SCCA No. 35 of 1994. In that case the Supreme Court considered the import of regulation 9 (by then it was regulation 8) and held that the regulation is not primitive but intended to bar advocates from acting in matters where conflict of interest is perceived. In the case of Patricia Ojangole (supra) the firm of Messrs Ligomarc and Co Advocates were found to be in an unethical role to represent the accused. The court considered inter alia the fact that the firm had been retained by the employers of the accused. Secondly the issue concerned documentary evidence to be relied upon in court upon which the witnesses would be cross examined. The law firm could not ethically be able to cross examine their own witnesses who would tender in documents drafted by them.

The matter before when considering the pleadings in their entirety as well as the affidavit evidence point to the fact that the whole transaction started from Messrs Nzige Jamero and Company Advocates. The performance /execution of transaction are also seen to be done by the same advocates. The legal enforcement of the agreement is also undertaken by them. In the case of Ayebazibwe Raymond vs. Barclays Bank and 3 others HCCS 165 of 2012, this aspect of conflict of interest was considered and the major line of the court concerned whether an advocate or firm of advocates against whom an objection on ethical grounds is made have to chose to appear either as advocates for the client or as witnesses.  Where they choose to appear as Counsel the court has been reluctant to disqualify such advocates from representing their client. The situation in this case is however different when the court considers the purported sale agreement. By all means they shall be required to testify on the same and that person will come from that firm. The Applicants Counsel contended that it is doubtful whether a person coming from the same law firm could in the interest of justice be in a position to lead evidence for the court to reach a just decision. There is a danger of conflict of interest. He prayed that the law firm in question is barred from representing the Respondent.

In reply Counsel Hilary Nzige the Respondents Counsel referred to regulation 9 of the Advocates (professional Conduct) regulations and submitted that it deals with an advocate and not a law firm. The impugned law firm has many advocates and specifically Counsel Hilary is not a party to the contested land sale.  Secondly the person referred to as a company secretary is not an advocate of the High Court and therefore cannot be a partner in the firm.

As far as conflict of interest is concerned, in him representing the Applicant/Plaintiff there would be conflict of interest. Counsel contended that where he is on the side of the Respondent, he does not see any conflict of interest. Had he crossed to represent the Plaintiff there would have been a conflict of interest. As long as he represents the Respondent who was a client of his, firm, he does not see any conflict of interest. The case of Patricia Ojangole (supra) is distinguishable. In that case there were two different parties but in this case it is the same party being represented by Counsel. In the premises the Respondents Counsel submitted that t he objection of the Applicants Counsel to him representing the Respondent lacks merit and ought to be rejected accordingly.

In rejoinder Counsel Senkumba submitted that the submission that regulation 9 (supra) deals with advocates cannot carry weight. This is because when the sale agreement is perused, it is not specific about the particular advocate who drafted it. It stopped at the mention of the name of the firm as Messrs Nzige Jamero and Company Advocates where Hilary Nzige is a senior partner.

Secondly as far as Isaac Atukunda is concerned, the submission that he is not an advocate is defeated by perusal of annexure A5 of the Applicant’s affidavit which describes the partners of the firm. It is the Applicant’s submission that a non advocate cannot be a partner in a law firm.

Finally the affidavit in reply of Atukunda Isaac, clearly reflected in paragraph 2 that the Applicant came to their law firm.  Consequently Isaac Atukunda is part of the firm. The whole transaction was by the entire law firm and not an individual as such. The firm should choose either to be a witness or Counsel but not both. In the premises the Applicants Counsel prayed that the objection is allowed.

Ruling

Proceedings in the application came for hearing on 26 November 2014 when the Applicant’s Counsel objected to the Defendant’s counsel. The matter was for ruling on 16 December 2014 but the ruling was not ready because the Applicant’s Counsel had not supplied the quoted case of Uganda Development Bank versus Kasirye Byaruhanga and Company Advocates (supra). On 16 December 2014 Counsel Hilary Nzige, Counsel for the Respondent informed the court that Counsel Kassim Kigongo did not have audience at the time he made submissions in court. He also informed court that he had written a letter to that effect. I have seen a letter received by the High Court on 18 December 2014 which was forwarded to me. It is dated 27th of November 2014 in which the Respondent’s lawyers write that Khassim Kigongo was admitted to the bar on 28 February 2014 and granted a practising certificate that only permits him audience before a Magistrate's Court. The letter relies on the Advocates (Enrolment and Certification) Regulations and particularly regulation 13 thereof. They write that having been entered on the roll of advocates on 28 February 2014, by 26th of November 2014 the said advocate had only practiced for eight months and his practising certificate only gave him audience before a Magistrate's court. Consequently the said counsel had committed a disciplinary offence and is liable to prosecution and punishment by the High Court or the law Council under section 11 (5) of the Advocates Act. Counsel submitted in the letter that the submissions in objection to the representation of the Respondent’s Counsel should be ignored.

I have listened to the audio proceedings for 26 November 2014. The hearing of the objection commenced at 3:15 PM. Counsel Senkumba Ahmed introduced the team of the Applicant but the main submissions in objection were made by Kassim Kigongo and his colleague counsel Senkumba Ahmed made submissions in rejoinder on behalf of the Applicant as well.

I have carefully considered the request of the Respondent’s lawyers to ignore the submissions of Counsel Kassim Kigongo. 28 February 2014 is the end of the month. Nine months from 28 February 2014 would be the end of November 2014. It would mean that the said advocate had practised for eight months and 26 days from the date of his certification. He was short of making a complete nine months by four days.

Regulation 13 of the Advocates (Enrolment and Certification) Regulations provides that a person to whom section 8 (5) (a) of the Act applies shall, for a period not less than nine months after the entry, have a right of audience only in a Magistrate’s court and the practising certificate issued to him or her shall be endorsed accordingly.

Section 11 (3), (4) and (5) of the Advocates Act is relevant as far as this matter is concerned. It provides that:

“(3) Subject to any regulations made under subsection (4), or under section 77(1)(f), every advocate who has in force a practising certificate may practise as such in the High Court or in any court subordinate to the High Court.

(4) The Law Council may by regulations prescribe that for a specified period of time after enrollment an advocate shall have a right of audience only before such courts as may be designated.

(5) Any advocate who contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of regulations made under subsection (4) commits an offence.”

The provision empowers the Law Council to specify the period of time after enrolment when an advocate shall have a right of audience before which court. Secondly the advocate who fails to comply with the provisions commits an offence. The section itself does not prescribe what happens to a litigant who is represented by an advocate in contravention of section 11 (5) of the Advocates Act or to any action of such an advocate in contravention of section 11 (5) of the Advocates Act. I considered a similar matter in HCMA No 421 of 2010 (Arising from HCCS No. 253 of 2010) LARB (U) Ltd, Azalia Lubega and Rose Lubega vs.  Greenland Bank (In Liquidation) and Sil Investments Ltd. In that case there was an objection to counsel for the applicant on the ground that he was counsel for the opposite party in the same case. In considering what would happen to previous proceedings in which he participated I based my decision on the provisions of section 14 A of the Advocates (Amendment) Act 2002 and held that:

“What happens to the applicant’s application then? I agree that section 14A of the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 2002 deals with this situation. No Pleadings, contract or other document made or actions taken on behalf of a client shall be invalidated by disqualification of an Advocate from representing a client for any reason. The actions of the Applicants Counsel prior to objection to his appearing are saved by this provision.”

As to whether this court should penalise the advocate concerned should await a proper trial of the issue. An advocate shall not be penalised without a formal hearing unless it is clear from the provisions that he has committed an offence. In the premises, because the matter has been referred according to the respondent’s Counsel to the Law Council, it will be handled by that Disciplinary Committee of the Council. As far as previous proceedings are concerned, the applicant is not prejudiced and I will consider the submissions on record to arrive at a decision on the merits of the objection.

The objection of the Plaintiff's as submitted is based on Regulation 9 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations SI 267 – 2.

The Plaintiff/Applicant’s Counsel advances the objection on what he perceives as a potential conflict of interest if Messieurs Nzige Jamero and Company Advocates represent the Defendant in this suit. The ground for the alleged potential conflict of interest is an agreement for the sale and purchase of land namely Kyadondo block 217 Plot 1282 land at Kiwatule registered in the names of the Plaintiff which sale agreement is dated 12th of June 2014. The sale agreement is between the Plaintiff and the Defendant/Respondent and is drawn by Messieurs Nzige Jamero and Company Advocates. The crux of the objection relates to the cause of action in the plaint in which the Applicant/Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the transaction was a money lending transaction and the Defendant fraudulently transferred the Plaintiff’s land. The Applicant/Plaintiff seeks an order of cancellation of the certificate of title and reinstatement of the Plaintiff as the registered proprietor as well as an injunction to restrain the Defendant from evicting the Plaintiff/Applicant from his property. The Plaintiff further seeks a declaration that the interest charged on the alleged money lending transaction by the Defendant is illegal, harsh and unconscionable, general damages and costs of the suit. It is averred in paragraph 4 (ix) of the Plaint that the Defendant through the lawyers indelicately and under a calculated misrepresentation made the needy Plaintiff to sign a sale agreement, transfer forms and other documents. Prior to the above paragraph of the plaint the Plaintiff alleges that he had gone to the Defendant for a loan but before the loan could be disbursed, the Defendant sent him to its lawyers Messieurs Nzige, Jamero and Company Advocates. Subsequently the Plaintiff avers that the he went to his bankers Equity bank to ask for a loan facility and due to the banks diligence, it discovered that the Defendant had fraudulently transferred the Plaintiff’s certificate of title into his names whereupon the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant’s lawyers who informed him that the property was registered in the names of the Defendant on account of failure to pay his obligations under the loan agreement. Subsequently the said firm of advocates issued an eviction notice for the Plaintiff to vacate the premises within seven days or be forcefully evicted. The Plaintiff's Counsel faults Messieurs Nzige Jamero and Company Advocates for being involved in the transaction and being Counsel in this case.

I have further considered the written statement of defence which was drawn by Messieurs Nzige Jamero and Company Advocates in which they aver that the plaint discloses no cause of action and in the alternative that what was paid to the Plaintiff was the purchase price of the property and the transaction was a sale of land transaction. The Defendant relies on the written agreement in issue as a duly executed land sale agreement.

Regulation 9 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations SI 267 – 2 provides:

“9.      Personal involvement in a client's case

No advocate may appear before any court or tribunal in any matter in which he or she has reason to believe that he or she will be required as a witness to give evidence, whether verbally or by affidavit; and if, while appearing in any matter, it becomes apparent that he or she will be required as a witness to give evidence whether verbally or by affidavit, he or she shall not continue to appear; except that this regulation shall not prevent an advocate from giving evidence whether verbally or by declaration or affidavit on informal or non-contentious matter of fact in any matter in which he or she acts or appears."

The regulation bars an advocate who may be required to appear as a witness to give oral or affidavit evidence in any contentious cause or matter from appearing before any court or tribunal hearing the matter. The regulation is permissive on one part and mandatory on another part. It stipulates that no advocate may appear in any matter in which he or she has reason to believe that he or she will be required as a witness to give evidence.

The first duty is placed on an advocate and is subjective in that it is upon the advocate based on his or her belief about the facts and circumstances of the case that he or she will be required to appear before the court or tribunal as a witness, to decide whether to represent a party in the proceedings. This first part of the regulation is couched in permissive terms and imposes a duty on an advocate to step down once he or she believes that he or she will be required to appear as a witness. The terminology used is where he or she “will be required” and not “may be required”. The provision was interpreted by Wanbuzi C.J in the Supreme Court case of Uganda Development Bank vs. Kasirye, Byaruhanga and Company Advocates SCCA No. 35 of 1994 when his Lordship the Hon Chief Justice held that   the expression “reason to believe that he will be required as a witness to give evidence” under regulation 9:

“...presupposes that an advocate who acts or appears in a case should know whether or not he would be required as a witness. If so, then he must not appear before a court as an advocate in the case.”

There has to be some certainty about the advocate’s belief that he or she as a matter of fact will be required to appear and give evidence. It is not merely a question of probability or potential. It is not the mere fact that the advocate has knowledge about the transaction and he may be competent to provide details about it. For instance where an advocate draws a will, but does not sign as a witnesses, it is only those witnesses who attested to the document who are required to prove the will. Similarly where an advocate or a firm of advocate draw an agreement, and the agreement is witnessed by one or two persons, it is only the witnesses and principal parties who can prove the document. On matters of who drew the document, where there is no controversy, the firm of advocates will not be required to appear as it is not their agreement but that of the parties to it and their witnesses. The question of what the witness is required to do is material.  The witness generally is required by a party who wants to adduce evidence based on the knowledge of the witness.

The second part of regulation 9 however makes it imperative for an advocate to cease appearing for a client when it appears or becomes apparent during the proceedings that he or she will be required to give evidence in the cause or matter before the court or tribunal. When it becomes apparent the advocate shall not continue with the representation of a client in the cause or matter. The total import of regulation 9 is that whatever the advocate believes, if it is apparent that the advocate will be required to appear as a witness he or she shall cease to represent the client. Belief of the advocate can only be based on what he or she knows.

The question remains as to what is meant about being required to appear as a witness. In the rules of pleading under the Civil Procedure Rules Order 6 rule 2 provides that every pleading shall be accompanied by a list of witnesses. In simple terms this means that a person required as a witness is listed as a witness. The rule to list potential witnesses in every pleading is mandatory. In the absence of any of the parties requiring the advocate to be a witness or applying for the leave of court to do so, then unless the court requires the advocate to appear as a witness, it cannot be concluded that the advocate will be required by any of the parties to the suit to appear as a witness. 

The head note of the regulation suggests that the regulation is about "personal involvement in a client's case." In other words an advocate cannot be a witness and Counsel at the same time. What is apparent is that the law tries to avoid an advocate who owes a duty to court to see that justice is done also being personally involved as a witness in the case. This is the import of the regulation and is enforceable. It may not be necessary to advance the intention of legislature in making regulation 9 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations SI 267 – 2. Nonetheless, it may be suggested among other things that an advocate who is likely to be a witness will carefully select the evidence which will only support his or her case strategy in the interest of his or her client. The duty of the advocate to the court may be compromised. It even evokes the American saying that “a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client”. A lawyer should not lead himself as a witness. There may be other illustrations which may convey the intention of legislature about the object of regulation 9. However the Defendant’s Counsel Hilary Nzige advanced some other arguments which suggest that the object of the regulation is not in issue.

He firstly contends that the regulation deals with an individual advocate who is involved as a witness. His argument was countered by the argument of the Applicant’s Counsel that the agreement sought to be impugned is drawn by a firm of advocates and does not indicate which particular advocate was involved in the transaction. Consequently the partners are responsible. On the other hand Counsel Hilary Nzige submitted that as an individual he was not involved in the transaction.

Secondly the deponent to the affidavit in reply to the application Mr. Atukunda Isaac the Company Secretary of the Defendant Company is not an advocate and the regulation does not apply to him. Lastly the Applicant’s Counsel submitted that Isaac Atukunda is mentioned in the firm letter head as a partner according to annexure “A5” attached to the affidavit in support of the Application. Annexure “A5” is a notice of eviction issued by Messrs Nzige, Jamero and Co. Advocates dated 25^th of September 2014. It notifies whoever reads the letter head that the partners of Messrs Nzige, Jamero and Co. Advocates are: Nzige Hilary, Alan Oketcho Jamero, Atukunda Isaac and Kirima Brian. In other words Atukunda Isaac who deposed the Defendant’s affidavit in reply is a partner in Messrs Nzige, Jamero and Company Advocates. However Isaac Atukunda is not appearing in the matter as an advocate for the parties but as a witness having deposed to an affidavit in a contentious matter.

As far as the Plaintiffs pleadings are concerned, the list of witnesses are:

1. The Plaintiff
2. Mrs Justine Kaziro
3. Hebert
4. James Mutibwa and
5. Any other with the leave of court.

None of the Advocates of Messrs Nzige, Jamero and Company advocates are listed as witnesses. At this stage the need to call them as witnesses by the Plaintiff is not apparent and therefore none of them was listed as a witness of the Plaintiff.

Secondly the written statement of defence of the Defendant lists the following witnesses namely:

1. The Defendant’s Company Secretary
2. The Defendant’s Managing Director,
3. Siraje Mugenyi,
4. Any other with the leave of court

As far as the defence is concerned, it is only the company secretary Mr. Isaac Atukunda of Messrs Nzige, Jamero and Company advocates who may be called as a witness by the Defendant.

Counsel appearing in this proceeding thus far is Counsel Hilary Nzige whose name neither appears in the Plaintiff’s list of documents nor in that of the Defendant.  It is therefore (and also literally) not apparent that he will be called to testify about anything.  In other words and in terms of regulation 9 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations SI 267 – 2, Hilary Nzige as an advocate (and not a firm of advocates) is not required to appear as a witness. Firstly on the basis of his belief, he informed court that he was not involved in the questioned transaction and he is not a witness. Secondly at an objective level he is not listed on any of the parties list of witnesses in the pleadings. Last but not least even the firm of advocates of Messrs Nzige, Jamero and Company advocates is not listed.  It was contended for the Applicant/Plaintiff that Hilary Nzige is a partner and the agreement which is being challenged in the main suit is only shown to be drawn by Messrs Nzige, Jamero and Co. Advocates. The argument is that as a partner Hilary Nzige cannot escape being called to answer as a witness on matters of fact. The short answer to that argument is that the firm is not listed as a witness. Secondly the firm is not a corporation but a partnership and only any of the partners of the firm of advocates may be listed as a witness. Being a witness is based on knowledge of facts and a person who is competent is the only person to testify on matters of fact of which he or she saw, heard or participated in. For the moment Hilary Nzige Counsel for the Respondent has not deposed any affidavit and is not listed by any of the parties as a witness.  

Last but not least the entire partnership cannot be excluded on the basis of regulation 9 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations SI 267 – 2. I agree that the regulation deals with individuals as required witnesses and not the firm. It is only an individual who can be a witness.  This is apparent from the last part of regulation 9 which provides that an advocate may give evidence whether verbally or by declaration or affidavit in formal and non – contentious matter of fact in any matter in which he or she acts or appears, that what is being barred in the first two parts of the regulation is an advocate being a witness and appearing as an advocate at the same time in contentious matters. The regulation does not deal with the potential of the advocate being called as a witness but the requirement of any of the parties to call him or her as a witness.

I was referred to two cases namely the High Court case of   Uganda versus Patricia Ojangole Criminal Case Number 1 of 2014 and that of the Supreme Court of Uganda namely the case of Uganda Development Bank vs. Kasirye, Byaruhanga and Company Advocates SCCA No. 35 of 1994.

Starting with the High Court case of Uganda versus Patricia Ojangole Criminal Case Number 1 of 2014 the case is clearly distinguishable on the ground that the complaint in that case was about the accused being represented by Messrs Ligomarc and Company Advocates who were also lawyers of the Uganda Development Bank (the principal complainant in the case against the accused). In this case there is no suggestion that Messrs Nzige, Jamero and Company Advocates also acted on behalf of the Plaintiff or that the Plaintiff is their former client.  Secondly the court considered regulation 10 together with regulation 9 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations. The court was concerned with the use of a fiduciary relationship with a client to the advocate’s advantage. The court considered conflict of interest under regulation 10 as reinforced by regulation 9. Regulation 9 was not interpreted. The ruling in that case does not have a bearing on the facts of this case where the Defendants Counsel represents the Defendant/Respondent in a matter where his firm drew an agreement on behalf of the Defendant/Respondent.

The intention of Regulation 9 was considered by the Supreme Court in Uganda Development Bank vs. Kasirye, Byaruhanga and Company Advocates SCCA No. 35 of 1994. In that case Platt Ag JSC held that the regulation aims at distinguishing between an advocate practicing before the court and a witness. Secondly the advocate in such cases has to choose either to be a witness or Counsel in contentious matter and not both.  Platt JSC held as follows:

"This regulation which stems from English practice, aims at drawing a distinction between an advocate practising before a court, and a witness in the form of the advocate himself. The regulation provides that the advocate shall not appear as advocate as well as offer evidence himself, whether by affidavit or oral evidence. While the distinction seems easy to grasp, it is not so easy in practice to deal with, as the proviso shows. The general result of the regulation is that an advocate appearing in the case can give evidence himself in formal or non-contentious matters of fact, but otherwise he may have to choose to be either advocate or witness.… Let us return to the statement of the position in England (Halsbury's laws of England third edition volume 2 at paragraph 102, fourth edition volume 3 paragraphs 1187 to the same effect). In the third edition the passage reads as follows:

‘A Barrister should not act as Counsel and witness in the same case, and he should not accept a retainer in the case in which he has reason to believe that he would be a witness, and if, being engaged in a case, it becomes apparent that he is a witness on a material question of fact, he ought not to continue to appear as Counsel if he can retire without jeopardising the client’s interests.’

In that statement of the situation, the sole criteria are whether the advocate before appearing, has reason to believe that he would be a witness in the case; or having appeared, and finding himself a witness, he ought not to continue to appear."

Justice Platt JSC suggested that the two roles of witness and Counsel in the same cause in contentious matters may not be compatible. Wambuzi CJ further held that it is generally accepted that the main intention of the regulation is that an advocate shall not act as Counsel and witness in the same case. There are however exceptions in the case of an advocate acting as witness and counsel in formal and non – contentious matters.

The above decision supports the submission of Counsel Hilary Nzige that he is not going to appear as a witness. Secondly regulation 9 Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations SI 267 – 2 deals with incompatibility of the role as advocate and witness in the same case and not conflict of interest. Conflict of interest is dealt with in other regulations such as regulation 4 and 10 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations SI 267 – 2. The decision in Uganda Development Bank vs. Kasirye, Byaruhanga and Company Advocates SCCA No. 35 of 1994 also supports my finding that there is no reason to believe that the Respondents Counsel is required to appear as a witness as a matter of fact. Secondly his knowledge of the transaction is not material. What is material is whether Counsel Hilary Nzige is required to appear as a witness and Counsel at the same time. Since Counsel Hilary Nzige is not required to appear as a witness the grounds for objections of the Applicant’s Counsel lack merit and the objection is overruled with costs.

Ruling delivered in open court on the 19th day of December 2014

Christopher Madrama Izama

Judge

Ruling delivered in the presence of:

Senkumba Ahmed assisted by Kigongo Kassim for the Applicant,

Atukunda Isaac Company Secretary of Respondent Company in advocate

Charles Okuni: Court Clerk

Christopher Madrama Izama

Judge

19/12/2014