THE 
REPUBLIC 
OF 
UGANDA 
IN 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
APPEAL 
OF 
UGANDA, 
AT 
KAMPALA 
CIVIL 
APPEAL 
NO. 
016 
OF 
2004 
THE 
CITY 
COUNCIL 
OF 
KAMPALAˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇˇAPPELLENT 


....................................... 


AND 


CRESTED 
CRANE 
TOURS 
AND 
TRAVEL 
LTD:::::::::::::::::: 
RESPONDENT 


CORAM: 
HON 
JUSTICE 
SOLOMY 
BALUNGI 
BOSSA 
JA; 
HON 
JUSTICE 
RICHARD 
BUTEERA, 
JA; 
HON 
JUSTICE 
KENNETH 
KAKURU, 
JA. 


JUDGMENT 
OF 
HON 
JUSTICE 
KENNETH 
KAKURU, 
JA 


This 
appeal 
arises 
from 
a 
decision 
of 
Hon.Justice 
V.F. 
Musoke-Kibuuka 
dated 
21st 
August 
2003 
in 
Civil 
Suit 
No. 
966 
of 
1999. 


The 
appellant 
was 
the 
defendant 
in 
the 
original 
suit 
and 
in 
which 
judgment 
was 
entered 
in 
favour 
of 
the 
respondent 
21/8/2003. 


At 
the 
hearing 
of 
this 
appeal 
Mr. 
Bernard 
Mutyaba 
Ssempa 
appeared 
for 
the 
appellant 
and 
Mr. 
Benson 
Tusasiirwe 
appeared 
for 
the 
respondent. 


Initially 
there 
were 
three 
grounds 
of 
appeal 
set 
out 
in 
the 
Memorandum 
of 
Appeal. 
However, 
at 
the 
commencement 
of 
this 
appeal 
Mr. 
Mutyaba 
Sempa 
learned 
counsel 
for 
the 
appellant 
withdrew 
grounds 
2 
and 
3 
leaving 


1 



only 
ground 
one 
for 
determination. 
I 
must 
state 
that 
learned 
counsel 
for 
the 
appellant 
rightly 
withdrew 
the 
grounds 
because 
they 
were 
too 
general 
and 
offended, 
in 
my 
view 
the 
provisions 
of 
Rule 
86 
of 
the 
Rules 
of 
this 
court. 
Had 
he 
not 
withdrawn 
them 
I 
would 
still 
have 
been 
inclined 
to 
strike 
them 
out. 


Therefore, 
there 
is 
left 
only 
one 
ground 
for 
determination 
in 
this 
appeal, 
that 
IS 
ground 
one, 
which 
states 
as 
follows: 


(1) 
"The 
learned 
trial 
judge 
erred 
in 
law 
and 
in 
fact 
when 
he 
made 
a 
finding 
that 
the 
appel/ant 
was 
duly 
served 
with 
the 
statutory 
notice.
J~ 


It 
is 
not 
in 
dispute 
that 
the 
appellant 
is 
a 
statutory 
body, 
a 
Local 
Government, 
and 
as 
such 
the 
respondent 
was 
required 
to 
serve 
upon 
it 
a 
Statutory 
Notice 
of 
Intention 
to 
sue 
under 
the 
provisions 
of 
the 
Civil 
Procedure 
and 
Limitations 
(Miscellaneous 
Provisions) 
Act. 


Counsel 
for 
the 
appellant 
urged 
that 
the 
appellant 
was 
not 
served 
with 
a 
Statutory 
Notice 
of 
Intention 
to 
sue. 
That 
no 
evidence 
whatsoever 
was 
adduced 
at 
the 
trial 
to 
show 
that 
the 
notice 
was 
served 
upon 
the 
appellant 
by 
the 
respondent 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
law. 
That 
although 
a 
Statutory 
Notice 
was 
issued 
by 
the 
respondent 
dated 
8/2/1999, 
it 
was 
never 
effectively 
served. 
However, 
he 
conceded 
that 
a 
copy 
of 
the 
notice 
was 
annexed 
to 
the 
plaint. 
He 
also 
conceded 
that 
it 
bears 
a 
stamp 
of 
appellant's 
legal 
department, 
the 
City 
Advocate's 
Office. 


2 



He 
urged 
that, 
the 
stamp 
and 
signature 
as 
indicated 
on 
the 
copy 
of 
the 
notice 
were 
not 
enough 
to 
prove 
effective 
service 
upon 
the 
appellant. 
Counsel 
contended 
that 
the 
mode 
of 
service 
of 
a 
Statutory 
Notice 
of 
Intention 
to 
sue 
is 
set 
in 
Regulation 
26 
of 
the 
third 
schedule 
of 
the 
Local 
Government 
Act, 
Cap 
243 
which 
provides 
that 
summons 
and 
notices 
or 
other 
documents 
required 
to 
be 
served 
upon 
a 
District 
or 
urban 
councils 
shall 
be 
served 
by 
delivering 
it 
to 
or 
by 
sending 
it 
by 
registered 
post 
to 
the 
Chief 
Administrative 
Officer 
or 
the 
Town 
Clerk. 


He 
relied 
on 
the 
case 
of 
Micheal 
Sansa 
and 
others 
versus 
Kampala 
City 
Council 
(HCCS 
No 
482 
of 
1999) 
(unreported) 
in 
which 
the 
High 
Court 
held,

(f; 
I.Af 
{jVV 


in 
that 
particular 
case, 
that 
a 
notice 
served 
which 
was} 
Qft 
the 
City 
Advocate's 
Office 
did 
not 
comply 
with 
Regulation 
26 
of 
the 
Local 
Government 
Act. 
He 
also 
cited 
the 
decision 
of 
this 
court, 
in: 


The 
City 
Division 
Council 
of 
Rubaga 
Versus 
Jimmy 
Muyanja, 
(Civil 
Appeal 
No. 
14 
of 
2002,) 
which 
cited 
the 
case 
of 
Micheal 
Sansa 
and 
others 
Versus 
Kampala 
City 
Council 
(Supra) 
with 
approval. 


In 
reply 
learned 
counsel 
for 
the 
respondent 
urgued 
that, 
the 
service 
was 
effective. 
He 
contended 
that 
service 
upon 
the 
City 
Advocate 
was 
effective 
service 
upon 
the 
Town 
Clerk. 
He 
urged 
that 
although 
the 
matter 
was 
framed 
as 
an 
issue 
it 
was 
never 
pleaded 
and 
was 
not 
canvassed 
by 
either 
party 
in 
evidence 
in 
chief 
or 
cross 
examination. 
He 
fully 
associated 
himself 
with 
the 
finding 
of 
the 
learned 
trial 
judge. 


3 



It 
is 
trite 
law 
that 
failure 
to 
serve 
a 
Statutory 
Notice 
of 
Intention 
to 
sue 
upon 
government, 
Local 
Government 
or 
scheduled 
Corporation, 
before 
filing 
a 
suit, 
renders 
the 
whole 
suit 
incompetent. 
See: 
Kampala 
City 
Council 
Versus 
Nuliyati 
[1974] 
EA 
400. 


The 
Mode 
of 
Service 
of 
the 
Statutory 
Notice 
is 
set 
out 
under 
Rule 
26 
of 
the 
third 
schedule 
of 
the 
Local 
Government 
Act 
Cap 
243 
which 
provides 
as 
follows:


"26Mode 
of 
Service 
of 
summons 
etc 


(1) 
Any 
summons, 
notices 
or 
other 
document 
required 
or 
authorised 
to 
be 
served 
on 
a 
district, 
urban 
or 
sub-county 
council 
shall 
be 
served 
by 
delivering 
it 
to 
or 
by 
sending 
it 
by 
registered 
post 
addressed 
to, 
the 
Town 
Clerk, 
Chief 
Administrative 
Officer 
or 
Chief 
of 
the 
sub-
county 
of 
the 
council. 
" 
It 
was 
contended 
by 
counsel 
for 
the 
appellant 
that 
there 
was 
none 
compliance 
with 
this 
rule 
as 
service 
was 
never 
affected 
on 
the 
Town 
Clerk, 
therefore 
there 
was 
no 
effective 
service. 
However, 
in 
his 
submission 
before 
this 
Court 
he 
conceded 
that 
the 
City 
Advocate 
was 
an 
agent 
of 
the 
Town 
Clerk 
and 
that 
service 
upon 
him 
would 
be 
effective 
service. 


I 
entirely 
agree 
that 
service 
upon 
the 
City 
Advocates 
is 
effective 
service 
upon 
the 
Town 
Clerk. 


4 



Indeed 
this 
is 
what 
Hon 
Justice 
V. 
Zehurikize 
(J) 
of 
the 
High 
Court 
held, 
when 
he 
stated 
in 
the 
case 
of 
Micheal 
Sansa 
Ltd 
and 
others 
VS 
KCC 
(Supra) 
which 
was 
cited 
and 
relied 
upon 
by 
the 
counsel 
for 
the 
appellant. 
At 
page 
8 
of 
his 
judgment 
he 
states 
as 
follows: 


{lifservice 
had 
been 
effected 
on 
the 
City 
Advocates, 
it 
would 
have 
been 
effective 
service 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
Regulation 
26, 
see 
Impact 
Proces 
Ltd 
(Supra). 
This 
is 
because 
a 
City 
Advocate 
is 
a 
clear 
agent 
of 
the 
Town 
Clerk, 
who 
is 
known 
to 
be 
responsible 
for 
legal 
matters 
of 
the 
City 
Council': 
(Emphasis 
mine) 


In 
the 
case 
of 
Impact 
Process 
Ltd 
Vs 
City 
Council 
of 
Kampala 
HCCS 
No 
929 
of 
1997 
(unreported). 
Hon 
J. 
H. 
Ntagoba 
(P.J) 
(as 
he 
then 
was) 
held 
that 
service 
upon 
the 
City 
Advocate 
was 
effective 
service 
upon 
the 
Town 
Clerk. 
He 
however 
struck 
out 
the 
suit, 
as 
the 
Statutory 
Notice 
in 
that 
particular 
case 
had 
been 
served 
upon 
a 
filing 
clerk 
in 
the 
office 
of 
the 
City 
Advocate. 
Clearly 
therefore 
the 
issue 
for 
determination 
in 
this 
appeal 
is 
whether 
the 
learned 
trial 
judge 
erred 
when 
he 
held 
that 
there 
was 
effective 
service 
upon 
the 
City 
Advocate 
as 
an 
agent 
for 
the 
Town 
Clerk. 


In 
the 
case 
of 
Impact 
Process 
Ltd 
Vs 
City 
Council 
of 
Kampala 
(Supra) 
evidence 
was 
adduced 
to 
show 
that 
service 
had 
been 
effected 
on 
a 
filing 
clerk. 


5 



In 
the 
case 
of 
Micheal 
Nsansa 
and 
others 
Versus 
KCC, 
(supra) 
it 
was 
shown 
by 
evidence 
in 
court 
that 
service 
had 
been 
effected 
on 
one 
Esther 
a 
clerk 
in 
the 
City 
Advocates 
Office. 
Court 
rightly 
found 
that 
there 
was 
no 
effective 
service 
upon 
the 
City 
Advocate. 


In 
the 
case 
of 
City 
Division 
of 
Rubaga 
Versus 
Jimmy 
Muyanja, 
(Civil 
Appeal 
No. 
14 
of 
2002). 
(unreported) 


This 
court 
was 
required 
to 
determine 
an 
issue 
that 
had 
been 
raised 
at 
the 
trial 
which 
had 
not 
resolved 
by 
the 
trial 
judge. 
That 
is: 


"Whether 
the 
Statutory 
Notice 
had 
been 
served 
upon 
the 
appellant 
in 
that 
case." 


In 
that 
case 
the 
matter 
had 
been 
brought 
in 
issue 
by 
way 
of 
preliminary 
objection. 
Court 
decided 
to 
resolve 
it 
upon 
hearing 
evidence. 
Evidence 
adduced 
in 
court 
on 
this 
issue, 
was 
that 
the 
person 
who 
is 
said 
to 
have 
effected 
service 
delivered 
the 
document 
to 
the 
Secretary 
of 
the 
Town 
Clerk 
at 
the 
reception 
of 
the 
Town 
Clerk's 
Office 
and 
a 
gentleman 
signed 
her 
delivery 
book. 


In 
her 
lead 
judgment, 
Hon 
Lady 
Justice 
C.N.B 
Kitumba 
(as 
she 
then 
was) 
observed 
as 
follows: 


'Personal 
knowledge 
of 
the 
person 
to 
be 
served 
is 
not 
necessary 
for 
effective 
service. 
Be 
that 
as 
it 
may, 
I 
am 
not 
convinced 
the 
service 
was 
effected 
on 
the 
appellant 
because 
of 
the 
following 
reason: 


6 



Firstly, 
the 
Statutory 
Notice 
which 
is 
annexture 
A 
in 
reply 
to 
the 
respondent's 
written 
statement 
of 
defence 
and 
the 
delivery 
book 
exhibit 
P5 
does 
not 
bear 
either 
a 
known 
signature 
of 
the 
Assistant 
Town 
Clerk 
or 
the 
appel/ant's 
stamp. 


Secondly, 
PW2's 
testimony 
is 
that 
she 
typed 
the 
Statutory 
Notice 
on 
3rd 
August 
2000 
and 
served 
it 
on 
the 
appellant 
on 
the 
same 
day. 
However, 
the 
Statutory 
Notice 
is 
dated 
1stAugust 
2000. 


Thirdly, 
PW2 
testified 
in 
cross 
examination 
that 
she 
does 
not 
know 
what 
a 
Statutory 
Notice 
is. 
It 
is 
possible 
that 
if 
she 
served 
any 
document 
to 
the 
appellant 
it 
might 
have 
been 
something 
else 
and 
not 
a 
Statutory 
Notice. 
" 


Clearly 
from 
the 
above, 
evidence 
was 
adduced 
in 
court 
as 
to 
service. 
The 
Statutory 
Notice 
did 
not 
bear 
any 
stamp 
of 
the 
office 
at 
which 
it 
was 
served. 
Court 
correctly 
found 
that 
there 
was 
no 
effective 
service. 


The 
above 
case 
is 
clearly 
distinguishable 
from 
the 
one 
from 
which 
this 
appeal 
arises. 
In 
this 
case 
Paragraph 
4 
of 
the 
plaint 
specifically 
avers 
that 


"The 
Statutory 
Notice 
of 
Intention 
to 
Sue 
was 
duly 
served 
upon 
the 
defendant. 
It 
is 
annexed 
to 
the 
plaint 
as 
annexture 
'F'." 


7 



Annexture 
'F' 
bears 
a 
rubber 
stamp 
with 
the 
following 
inscriptions: 


Legal 
Department 


City 
Advocates 
Office 


12Feb 
1999 


P. 
O. 
Box 
7010 
Kampala 
The 
stamp 
also 
bears 
a 
signature. 
In 
the 
appellant's 
written 
statement 
of 
defence 
which 
has 
only 
4 
paragraphs 
none 
of 
them 
specifically 
traverses 
paragraph 
4 
of 
the 
plaint. 
Paragraph 
2 
of 
the 
written 
statement 
of 
defence 
simply 
states 
that 
paragraph 
4 
of 
the 
plaint 
is 
denied. 


At 
the 
hearing 
of 
this 
appeal 
Mr. 
Mutyaba 
Sempa 
strongly 
argued 
that 
paragraph 
3 
of 
the 
written 
statement 
of 
defence 
effectively 
traversed 
paragraph 
4 
of 
the 
plaint. 
Paragraph 
4 
of 
the 
written 
statement 
of 
defence 
reads 
as 
follows: 


"The 
suit 
is 
barred 
by 
Act 
20 
of 
1969 
and 
the 
Local 
Government 
Act, 
1999 
and 
the 
defendant 
will 
move 
court 
at 
or 
before 
the 
hearing 
that 
it 
be 
struck 
out 
with 
costs. 
If 


When 
the 
hearing 
of 
the 
case 
proceeded 
at 
the 
trial, 
Mr. 
Mutyaba 
Sempa 
who 
was 
is 
also 
counsel 
for 
the 
plaintiff, 
now 
appellant 
did 
not 
raise 
any 
preliminary 
objection 
at 
all, 
in 
regard 
to 
the 
Statutory 
Notice. 


8 



The 
issue, 
whether 
or 
not 
the 
suit 
was 
barred 
by 
statute 
was 
never 
raised 
as 
a 
preliminary 
objection 
neither 
was 
it 
framed 
as 
an 
issue. 
It 
seems 
to 
have 
been 
abandoned. 


The 
issue 
of 
the 
service 
of 
Statutory 
Notice 
was 
framed 
as 
an 
issue 
at 
the 
scheduling 
conference. 
The 
Statutory 
Notice 
was 
not 
listed 
among 
"agreed 
documents" 
at 
the 
conferencing. 


The 
suit 
then 
proceeded 
with 
the 
testimonies 
of 
witnesses. 


The 
plaintiff 
called 
three 
witnesses 
and 
the 
defendant 
now 
appellant 
called 
one 
witness. 
None 
of 
the 
witnesses 
testified 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
service 
of 
the 
Statutory 
Notice 
at 
all. 
Counsel 
for 
the 
defendant 
then 
did 
not 
raise 
it 
at 
all 
in 
the 
cross 
examination. 


Surprisingly, 
both 
counsel 
submitted 
on 
the 
issue 
in 
their 
written 
submissions. 


In 
his 
submission 
on 
appeal 
Mr. 
Mutyaba 
Sempa 
did 
not 
deny 
knowledge 
of 
annexture 
'F' 
to 
the 
plaint. 
His 
argument 
was 
that 
service 
was 
not 
effective 
as 
the 
notice 
was 
not 
served 
on 
the 
Town 
Clerk 
in 
person. 
He 
later 
conceded 
that 
service 
on 
the 
City 
Advocate 
was 
effective 
service 
on 
the 
Town 
Clerk 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
Rule 
26 
of 
Schedule 
3 
of 
the 
Local 
Govt 


Act. 


He 
strongly 
argued 
that 
service 
on 
any 
person 
at 
the 
City 
Advocates 
Office 
could 
not 
be 
effective 
service. 


9 



He 
relied 
on 
the 
authorities 
of 
the 
City 
Division 
of 
Rubaga 
Versus 
Jimmy 
MuyanjaCivilAppealNo14of2002 
(CourtofAppeal)(unreported).(supra) 
and 
Micheal 
Nsansa 
and 
others 
Versus 
KCC 
(HCCS 
No 
482 
of 
1999). 
(unreported). 


I 
have 
already 
noted 
that 
in 
these 
two 
cases 
the 
facts 
are 
clearly 
distinguishable 
from 
those 
from 
which 
this 
appeal 
arises. 
In 
both 
cases 
cited 
above, 
evidence 
was 
adduced 
as 
to 
service, 
witnesses 
were 
called 
and 
cross 
examined. 


However, 
in 
this 
particular 
case 
before 
me, 
the 
judge 
and 
the 
parties 
seem 
to 
have 
accepted 
annexture 
'F' 
to 
the 
plaint 
as 
part 
of 
the 
evidence 
at 
the 
trial. 
The 
only 
issue 
was 
its 
evidential 
value. 


The 
learned 
trial 
judge 
was 
satisfied 
that 
the 
Statutory 
Notice 
was 
received, 
stamped 
and 
signed 
in 
acknowledgement 
of 
receipt 
by 
the 
legal 
department 
of 
City 
Advocates 
Office, 
Kampala 
on 
12th 
Feb 
1999. 


In 
my 
view 
annexture 
'F' 
was 
prima 
facie 
evidence 
of 
service. 
Since, 
the 
respondent 
had 
presented 
prima 
facie 
evidence 
of 
service, 
in 
my 
view 
he 
discharged 
his 
evidential 
burden. 
The 
evidential 
onus 
then 
shifted 
to 
the 
appellant. 
The 
onus 
shifted 
to 
the 
appellant 
to 
show 
that 
service 
was 
not 
effective. 
It 
was 
up 
to 
him 
to 
show 
that 
it 
had 
been 
effected 
upon 
a 
"sweeper" 
or 
"tea 
girl" 
or 
a 
clerk 
as 
counsel 
for 
the 
appellant 
submitted, 
in 
this 
court. 


10 



It 
was, 
upon 
the 
appellant 
to 
show 
or 
prove 
that 
the 
stamp 
was 
a 
forgery 
or 
the 
signature 
was 
unknown. 
He 
did 
not. 
I 
hasten 
to 
add 
that 
because 
he 
had 
not 
pleaded 
any 
defence 
to 
paragraph 
4 
of 
the 
plaint, 
rules 
of 
evidence 
would 
not 
have 
permitted 
him 
to 
adduce 
evidence 
on 
a 
matter 
that 
was 
not 
pleaded 
in 
defence. 


Be 
that 
as 
it 
may, 
he 
ought 
to 
have 
raised 
the 
issue 
at 
least 
in 
cross 
examination. 
He 
did 
not. 


It 
is 
trite 
law 
that 
one 
who 
alleges 
must 
prove. 
The 
burden 
of 
proof 
therefore 
lies 
on 
the 
plaintiff. 
However, 
once 
this 
burden 
is 
discharged, 
the 
evidential 
burden 
shifts 
to 
the 
defendant, 
or 
respondent 
as 
the 
case 
may 
be. 


InthecaseofCol 
(Rtd) 
Dr.Besigye 
KizzaVs 
Museveni 
Yoweri 
Kaguta 
and 
another, 
Supreme 
Court 
Election 
Petition 
No 
1 
of 
2001 
(unreported). 
Hon. 
Odoki 
C.J 
had 
this 
to 
say 
on 
the 
shifting 
onus 
at 
page 
176 
of 
his 
judgement. 


'~s 
far 
as 
the 
shifting 
of 
the 
burden 
of 
adducing 
evidence 
is 
concerned, 
it 
is 
stated 
in 
Sarker's 
Law 
of 
Evidence 
Vol 
1, 
14'h 
edition 
Reprint 
1997, 
pages 
1338 
-1340 
as 
follows: 


It 
appears 
to 
me 
that 
there 
can 
be 
sufficient 
evidence 
to 
shift 
the 
onus 
from 
one 
side 
to 
the 
other 
if 
the 
evidence 
is 
sufficient 
prima 
facie 
to 
establish 
the 
case 
of 
the 
party 
on 
whom 
the 
onus 
lies. 


11 



What 
is 
meant 
is 
that 
in 
the 
first 
instance 
the 
party 
on 
whom 
the 
onus 
lies 
must 
prove 
his 
case 
sufficiently 
tojustify 
ajudgment 
in 
his 
favour 
if 
there 
is 
170 
evidence. 
Sloney 
Vs 
Easlborne 
Rd 
Council 
(1927) 
1 
Ch. 
367, 
397" 


In 
the 
same 
case 
Besigye 
Vs 
Museveni 
(supra) 
Justice 
Tsekooko 
JSC 
statesonpage 
143ofhisjudgment. 


':...Once 
the 
petitioner 
had 
proved 
fabrication 
and 
falsity, 
the 
burden 
shifted 
to 
first 
respondent 
to 
prove 
otherwise" 


See 
also 
the 
judgment 
of 
this 
court 
in 
the 
case 
of 
James 
Mboijana 
Vs 
Caroline 
Mboijana 
(Civil 
Appeal 
No 
87 
2002) 
unreported." 


In 
my 
view, 
the 
respondent 
discharged 
his 
burden 
when 
he 
produced 
a 
copy 
of 
the 
Notice 
of 
Intention 
to 
Sue, 
duly 
stamped 
and 
signed 
as 
already 
indicated 
above. 
At 
that 
point 
the 
evidential 
burden 
shifted 
to 
the 
appellant 
to 
prove 
that 
the 
notice 
was 
never 
received. 
He 
failed 
to 
do 
so. 
In 
fact 
he 
opted 
not 
to 
challenge 
the 
service 
both 
in 
his 
written 
statement 
of 
defence 
and 
in 
cross 
examination. 


Consequently, 
the 
evidence 
on 
record 
as 
to 
service 
of 
the 
notice 
remained 
unchallenged. 
This 
is 
how 
this 
case 
is 
distinguishable 
from 
that 
of 
Micheal 
Ssansa 
(supra) 
and 
that 
of 
Jimmy 
Muyanja 
(supra). 


Suffice 
it 
to 
say, 
I 
entirely 
agree 
with 
the 
reasoning 
and 
conclusion 
of 
the 
learned 
trial 
judge 
on 
this 
issue. 


12 



This 
ground 
therefore 
must 
fail. 
Since 
it 
is 
the 
only 
ground 
for 
determination, 
this 
appeal 
fails, 
and 
it 
is 
accordingly 
dismissed 
with 
costs, 
in 
this 
court 
and 
in 
the 
court 
below. 


Dated 
at 
Kampala, 
this 
~ 
day 
of 
September 
2013. 


Kenne~ 


JUSTICE 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
APPEAL 


13