2.
The learned trial judge erred in law and fact when she failed to vigorously evaluate the evidence on record and thus erroneously finding
the accused guilt of the offence of defilement.
3.
The learned trial judge erred in law and fact in failing to direct the jury and herself to approach the child’s evidence with
caution in the circumstances of the case.
4.
The learned trial judge erred in law and fact alluding to the weaknesses of the defence case and thereby seemed to illegally shift
the evidential burden upon the appellant.
5.
The learned trial judge erred in law and fact when she sentenced the appellant to twenty years imprisonment (Life imprisonment).”
Mr. Hassan Kamba, learned counsel for the appellant, argued all grounds separately beginning with ground 2. We shall handle grounds
2, 3 and 4 together as they are interrelated and concern the evaluation of the evidence. On grounds 2,3, and 4, counsel’s complaint
was that the learned trial judge did not properly evaluate the evidence. Counsel submitted that the prosecution evidence did not
prove that sexual intercourse had taken place. According to counsel, PW2 did not see the appellant having sexual intercourse with
the complainant. Besides, medical evidence did not prove that the complainant was defiled. He argued further that the complainant’s
evidence was valueless. Counsel criticised the learned judge for basing the conviction on the weakness of the defence rather than
the strength of the prosecution case.
Mr. Ahimbisibwe Harrison, learned Senior State Attorney, disagreed. He supported the trial judge’s finding that PW2 saw the
appellant committing the offence. It was broad day light and she must have seen what was happening. He submitted that medical evidence
supported her testimony. In counsel’s view, the prosecution evidence was sufficient to warrant the appellant’s conviction.
We note that the evidence to implicate the appellant was that of PW2. PW2 testified that she saw the appellant in the banana plantation
lying on top of the complainant. He was having sexual intercourse with her. The appellant had removed his trousers and the victim’s
dress was pushed up and her knickers were in her hands. The witness was about 10 metres from the place where the appellant and the
victim were. In our view, it is unbelievable that PW2 who was about 10 metres away from where the appellant and the complainant were
could see them having sex. In our view, although it was daytime, that action could not have been observed from that far. Besides,
the scene was in a banana plantation. We accept Mr. Kamba’s submission that medical evidence did not prove that sexual intercourse
had taken place. According to the medical evidence, the complainant’s hymen was not ruptured and there were no injuries on
her thighs, elbows or back. The report stated that there were signs of penetration but the doctor did not indicate to court what
those signs were. We are, therefore, unable to know the basis of the doctor’s opinion. An expert opinion as it is must be based
on scientific grounds. We can not base ourselves on a baseless opinion. The complainant’s unsworn testimony in court was as
follows:
“I am Betty Nakoma Eluzabeth. I don’t know my age. I go to school. I am in P.1 at Kakoma Primary School. I have seen him
but I have never seen him. That’s all.”
There was no cross-examination of this witness. In our opinion, the complainant’s evidence did not at all connect the appellant
to the offence. PW2’s testimony to the effect that the appellant gave the complainant two hundred shillings is hearsay. With
due respect, the learned trial judge, should not have relied on it.
The submission by appellant’s counsel that the learned trial judge based the appellant’s conviction on the weakness of
the defence case rather than the strength of the prosecution case is well taken. We have anxiously perused the record as indicated
above and we find that there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed by the appellant. It is obvious from the judgement
that the learned trial judge, with due respect, concluded that the appellant was guilty of defilement based on the weakness of the
defence. For example, the learned judge found that the appellant was a liar because he stated on oath that he had forgotten the name of PW3 who took him to the last funeral
rites function.
It is trite law that the prosecution has a duty to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The learned judge properly
stated that principle at the beginning of her judgement and in her direction to the assessors but did not, with due respect, apply
it to the instant appeal.
It was for the foregoing reasons that we allowed the appeal.